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The Federalist

The FederalistFederalist No 1 - General IntroductionFederalist No 2 - Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and InfluenceFederalist No 3 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and InfluenceFederalist No 4 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and InfluenceFederalist No 5 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and InfluenceFederalist No 6 - Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the StatesFederalist No 7 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the StatesFederalist No 8 - The Consequences of Hostilities Between the StatesFederalist No 9 - The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and InsurrectionFederalist No 10 - The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and InsurrectionFederalist No 11 - The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a NavyFederalist No 12 - The Utility of the Union In Respect to RevenueFederalist No 13 - Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in GovernmentFederalist No 14 - Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory AnsweredFederalist No 15 - The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionFederalist No 16 - The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionFederalist No 17 - The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionFederalist No 18 - The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionFederalist No 19 - The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionFederalist No 20 - The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionFederalist No 21 - Other Defects of the Present ConfederationFederalist No 22 - The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present ConfederationFederalist No 23 - The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the UnionFederalist No 24 - The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further ConsideredFederalist No 25 - The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further ConsideredFederalist No 26 - The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense ConsideredFederalist No 27 - The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense ConsideredFederalist No 28 - The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense ConsideredFederalist No 29 - Concerning the MilitiaFederalist No 30 - Concerning the General Power of TaxationFederalist No 31 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of TaxationFederalist No 32 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of TaxationFederalist No 33 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of TaxationFederalist No 34 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of TaxationFederalist No 35 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of TaxationFederalist No 36 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of TaxationFederalist No 37 - Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of GovernmentFederalist No 38 - The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan ExposedFederalist No 39 - The Conformity of the Plan to Republican PrinciplesFederalist No 40 - The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and SustainedFederalist No 41 - General View of the Powers Conferred by the ConstitutionFederalist No 42 - The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further ConsideredFederalist No 43 - The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further ConsideredFederalist No 44 - Restrictions on the Authority of the Several StatesFederalist No 45 - The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments ConsideredFederalist No 46 - The Influence of the State and Federal Governments ComparedFederalist No 47 - The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different PartsFederalist No 48 - These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each OtherFederalist No 49 - Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a ConventionFederalist No 50 - Periodic Appeals to the People ConsideredFederalist No 51 - The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different DepartmentsFederalist No 52 - The House of RepresentativesFederalist No 53 - The Same Subject Continued: The House of RepresentativesFederalist No 54 - The Apportionment of Members Among the StatesFederalist No 55 - The Total Number of the House of RepresentativesFederalist No 56 - The Same Subject Continued: The Total Number of the House of RepresentativesFederalist No 57 - The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with RepresentationFederalist No 58 - Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands ConsideredFederalist No 59 - Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of MembersFederalist No 60 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of MembersFederalist No 61 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of MembersFederalist No 62 - The SenateFederalist No 63 - The Senate ContinuedFederalist No 64 - The Powers of the SenateFederalist No 65 - The Powers of the Senate ContinuedFederalist No 66 - Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further ConsideredFederalist No 67 - The Executive DepartmentFederalist No 68 - The Mode of Electing the PresidentFederalist No 69 - The Real Character of the ExecutiveFederalist No 70 - The Executive Department Further ConsideredFederalist No 71 - The Duration in Office of the ExecutiveFederalist No 72 - The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive ConsideredFederalist No 73 - The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto PowerFederalist No 74 - The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the ExecutiveFederalist No 75 - The Treaty Making Power of the ExecutiveFederalist No 76 - The Appointing Power of the ExecutiveFederalist No 77 - The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive ConsideredFederalist No 78 - The Judiciary DepartmentFederalist No 79 - The Judiciary Department ContinuedFederalist No 80 - The Powers of the JudiciaryFederalist No 81 - The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial AuthorityFederalist No 82 - The Judiciary ContinuedFederalist No 83 - The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by JuryFederalist No 84 - Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and AnsweredFederalist No 85 - Concluding RemarksALL

Federalist No 5 - The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence

The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
For the Independent Journal.
Author: John Jay

To the People of the State of New York:

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION."

It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.

When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to protect.

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.








Presented: 27-Apr-2024 02:27:26

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